Macalester International
Volume 15 Hybrid Geographies in the Eastern
Mediterranean: Views from the Bosphorus

Article 10

Winter 2005

Turkey and the European Union: The Domestic
Politics of Negotiating Pre-Accession
Kemal Kirisci
Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl
Recommended Citation
Kirisci, Kemal (2005) "Turkey and the European Union: The Domestic Politics of Negotiating Pre-Accession," Macalester
International: Vol. 15, Article 10.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol15/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute for Global Citizenship at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Macalester International by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information,
please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.

Turkey and the European Union:
The Domestic Politics of
Negotiating Pre-Accession
Kemal Kirisci

I. Introduction

I

n May 2004, ten countries joined the European Union (EU), to
be followed by two more countries most probably in 2007. Turkey,
together with Croatia, is the next country in line to enter the preaccession process for membership. Turkey was given candidate status
in December 1999 at the Helsinki European Council summit. However, accession negotiations with Turkey will only start if the European
Commission concludes that Turkey has indeed met the Copenhagen
political criteria and EU member governments make a positive decision at their European Council meeting in December 2004.1 Unlike the
case of other candidate countries, the decision “to give or not to give”
a negotiating date to Turkey stands as a very great challenge. A variety
of reasons—ranging from the size and population of Turkey, its geographical location, its low level of economic development compared to
the EU, and, more importantly, the fact that the overwhelming majority of the population is Muslim—make determining a date for the start
of the negotiations an extremely controversial and difficult issue for
many EU governments and for European public opinion.
Turkey itself is facing massive challenges as a function of its aspiration to join the EU. In November 2000, the EU adopted the Accession Partnership document, which listed the reforms that Turkey was
expected to adopt to be able to meet the Copenhagen political criteria.2 Turkey has come very close to meeting these criteria. However,
this became possible only after three years of divisive debates and
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resistance to reforms from “Euroskeptic” circles in Turkey. It was the
decisive outcome of the November 2002 elections that brought in a
government with a strong will to meet the political criteria that made
this change possible. Nevertheless, reforms such as the lifting of the
death penalty, the introduction of cultural rights for ethnic minorities
(especially Kurds), the expansion of various democratic freedoms, the
introduction of legal and administrative measures to curb endemic
torture, and institutional arrangements to reduce the influence of the
military in Turkish politics, were all major challenges to the political system. These have been reforms that Euroskeptics energetically
resisted at every stage. Now that the reforms have been adopted, there
are still efforts to hinder their implementation. However, this resistance
is weakening as the Turkish state and society are being transformed in
an unprecedented manner.
In the last few years, Turkey has also had to meet challenges in the
area of foreign policy. Most important has been the question of Cyprus.
Although the resolution of the Cyprus situation is not a prerequisite
(in the sense that it is not part of the Copenhagen political criteria), the
European Commission as well as EU governments and the European
Parliament have made it quite clear that Turkey is much more likely to
receive a date for accession negotiations if the question is resolved.
The survival of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)
as an independent and separate state had long been an unquestioned
national cause in Turkey. Former prime minister of Turkey Bülent Ecevit summarized this preference in May 1999 as “no solution is actually
the solution.” However, both in TRNC as well as in Turkey, emerging
public opinion questioned the traditional policy. Early in 2004, the government’s policy shifted drastically. This, in turn, opened the way to a
round of negotiations culminating in the referendum of 24 April 2004
over the “Annan Plan.” The change in Turkish policy was no less than
a revolution that required bitter political battles. It is highly unlikely
that this would have occurred without the pressure of the EU and the
carrot of EU membership.
Similar observations can be made about Turkey’s policy toward the
war in Iraq in general, and the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq in specific. The EU is far from having a Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP). It has been aspiring to develop one since the adoption of the
Treaty on the European Union in 1992. Yet, as the crisis over the United
States’ intervention in Iraq demonstrated, the EU became bitterly split.
Nevertheless, the decision of the Turkish parliament in March 2003
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not to allow U.S. troops to transit through Turkey came as a surprise
to many Europeans. Many in Europe had believed that Turkey was
too loyal or too dependent on the United States. There were also those
who suspected that Turkey could become a “Trojan horse” of the U.S.
within the EU. This was a powerful feeling, particularly among the
French who traditionally have opposed the Americans and have advocated for a strong and independent EU foreign and security policy.
Furthermore, the March 2003 decision also demonstrated that Turkey
was able to reach a democratic decision on such a critical issue. Many
Europeans had thought that Turkey would concede to the pressures
of the pro-American military. In a similar manner, the government
also resisted pressure from military and nationalist circles to militarily
intervene in northern Iraq to preempt the prospective emergence of an
independent Kurdish state. Then in October 2003, after securing the
parliament’s authorization to deploy troops in Iraq, the government
chose not to send troops, after Iraqis and especially Kurds opposed it.
These decisions were appreciated by the public and by governmental
circles in the EU.
In the midst of all these challenges, slowly but surely the EU and
Turkey are moving closer together. Unless a crisis erupts, all indications are that the likelihood of Turkey receiving a date to start accession
negotiations is increasing. The challenge now seems to be centered on
whether the European Council member states will actually live up to
their end of the deal reached at the Council summits in December 1999
and 2002.
How can one explain the political process that has brought Turkey,
after four decades of membership aspirations, to the very gates of EU
membership? This essay will argue that the process was primarily
driven by a long and often bitter process of “negotiation” between
advocates and opponents of membership within Turkey, on the one
hand, and between a range of Turkish “negotiators or players” and
their EU counterparts, on the other.
This process of negotiation might best be captured with the help of
Putnam who, in his seminal work, envisages negotiations (diplomacy)
to be composed of two sets of games that are being pursued simultaneously.3 There are the negotiations being pursued between diplomats or
decision makers at one level, and there are also the negotiations taking
place between these decision makers and their respective national constituencies at another level. In other words, the decision makers have
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to be able to “sell” the decision made at the first level to the actors in
the second one, or to the public in the largest sense of the word.
A modification to this model can help to better explain the Turkish
case. It is also useful to add three more elements to the two-level games
to make them more reflective of the domestic political aspects of international interactions. The first one is the way decision makers in one
country interact with the public in the other country. The second one
involves the level of interaction that takes place between the civil societies of the two countries. The third element concerns the way critical
third-party players, such as the European Union, NATO, or the United
States, relate or interact with domestic actors involved in negotiation
in a particular domestic context. The latter case is particularly critical because the discourse and policies adopted by the third party can
help tip the balance in favor of one or the other player in the domestic
negotiation. This essay argues that the balance in the domestic negotiation scene in Turkey has been very much a function of the nature of the
relationship between Turkey and the EU. The more the EU and Turkey
have engaged in a “virtuous-constructive” rather than a “negativeexclusionary” set of discursive interactions, the more the pro-membership players have been strengthened, both in Turkey and the EU.
If the negotiation game is thought of in terms of iterations both at the
domestic as well as at the EU-Turkey level, the process has been edging both sides closer and closer. However, the decision to be reached in
December 2004 at the European Council remains the ultimate arbiter of
whether the pro-EU membership players in Turkey will prevail.
II. Historical Background:
From the Ankara Treaty of 1963 to the Pending December 2004
Amsterdam Summit of the European Council
Turkey’s quest to become part of Europe and, later, the European Union
has been a long one. A Westernization and modernization process
started as early as the late 18th century in the Ottoman Empire. However, it was with the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923 and
with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s reforms that Turkey embarked upon a
systematic and profound modernization project. Ataturk defined his
efforts to achieve a modern, secular, and Western society as a process of “catching up” with contemporary civilization. This process was
itself manifested in an aspiration to become part of Europe.4 From
the early days of the Turkish republic, the primary aim of Ataturk
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and his supporters was to see the country recognized as a respected
European power.5 In 1949, Turkey became a founding member of the
Council of Europe, and joined NATO in 1952. Turkey’s relationship
with the European Economic Community (EEC) started in 1959, when
the government applied for associate membership.6 This application
resulted in the Ankara Association Agreement on 12 September 1963.
The provisions of this Agreement envisaged a gradual process of economic integration between Turkey and the EEC. Article 28 also raised
the prospects of eventual Turkish membership in the EEC. In 1970,
the Additional Protocol was signed. The Protocol envisaged a 22-year
transitional period that would end with the establishment of a customs union. Yet Turkey’s relationship with the European Community
(EC) experienced problems from the mid-1970s onwards because of
Turkey’s internal economic problems and political instability. The military coup of 1980 worsened relations. The early 1980s also coincided
with Greece’s membership in the EC. Once a member, Greece rose
regular objections to any improvement in EC-Turkish relations because
of Greek-Turkish bilateral problems and Cyprus. Nevertheless, transition to democracy and economic liberalization led Turkey to apply for
membership in 1987. In its opinion of 17 December 1989, the Commission concluded that Turkey was not ready to be a member of the European Union for economic, political, and social reasons.7 However, the
Commission did not in any way question the right of Turkey to become
a member of the EC sometime in the future. This is, of course, in stark
contrast to the Commission’s failure to consider Morocco’s 1987 application on the grounds that Morocco is not a European country.
After the end of the Cold War, most of the 1990s were a very difficult period for Turkey as violence in southeast Turkey increased and
the Kurdish problem, together with widespread human rights violations, led to a marked deterioration in EU-Turkish relations.8 Nevertheless, in spite of considerable resistance from human rights circles and
the European Parliament, in the end both sides succeeded in signing
the Customs Union Agreement of January 1996.9 In Turkey this new
treaty was very much perceived as a vital step toward eventual full
membership.10 Hence, when at the Luxembourg summit of the European Council in December 1997, Turkey was not included in the list of
candidate countries for the next round of enlargement, there was considerable governmental and public disillusionment as well as anger. In
protest, the Turkish government went as far as breaking off political
dialogue with the EU, and refused to attend any EU meetings. The
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Turkish government feared that the EU wanted to develop a “special
relationship” with Turkey that would fall short of membership.11
A major breakthrough came at the December 1999 EU summit in
Helsinki when Turkey was granted candidate status. Many factors
played a role in this dramatic turnaround in the EU’s position.12 The
arrival of the social democrat government of Gerhard Schröder in Germany in 1999, replacing Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democrat dominated
government, had a major impact on the decision. Christian Democrats
have traditionally been much less sympathetic to Turkish membership
in the EU. The end of the violence surrounding the Kurdish problem
in Turkey with the capture and trial of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of
the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and the formation of a
new coalition government in April, led by the social democrat Bülent
Ecevit, opened the way toward improving democracy in the country.
Ecevit wrote a personal letter in June 1999 to his German counterpart
Schröder that he was committed to democratizing and liberalizing
the country, and he expressed his expectation of support for eventual
Turkish membership.13 Relations between Greece and Turkey began
to improve, too. The efforts of both foreign ministers, George Papandreou and Ismail Cem, received growing public support subsequent to
the two earthquakes the countries experienced in the summer of 1999.
An unprecedented process of rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations
began, both at the governmental and the societal level. Greece actually became a vocal advocate of Turkish membership in the European
Union.14 These factors created a climate conducive to the Helsinki decisions. Most importantly, the Helsinki summit foresaw the preparation
of an Accession Partnership document that outlined the economic and
political reforms that had to be adopted by Turkey to meet the Copenhagen criteria. This procedure was employed with the other candidate
countries at the December 1997 Luxembourg summit. In return, Turkey prepared a national program outlining the reforms to be made in
the short and long terms.
In the summer of 2001, the Turkish parliament finally adopted a
series of critical amendments to the Turkish constitution to facilitate
political reforms that met the Copenhagen criteria. These reforms were
welcomed by the progress report published by the European Commission in 2001, although the report also noted that there was still a lot
of ground to cover before the Copenhagen political criteria would be
met.15 These developments coincided with continued improvement in
Greek-Turkish relations as well as a major breakthrough on Cyprus,
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when Rauf Denktash and Glascos Klerides met in December 2001 with
the intention of restarting negotiations for the settlement of the Cypriot
problem. Furthermore, a compromise agreement was reached between
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States about the use of
NATO facilities in the context of the European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP), adding to the positive climate in EU-Turkish relations.16
This climate played a critical role in resolving the objections of some
members of the EU to Turkey’s participation in the Convention on the
Future of Europe.17 This was reflected in the decision of the Laeken
European Council summit in December 2001. Turkey had finally
gained access to the Convention. In Turkey this was received as a very
positive development, considering that Turkey had been completely
left out of the institutional arrangements to accommodate the new
wave of enlargement introduced by the Nice Treaty of 2000.
However, in 2002, the reform process slowed when Euroskeptics,
as well as the nationalist right-wing partner of the coalition government, led by Devlet Bahçeli, began to object to some of the critical
reforms required for meeting the Copenhagen political criteria.18 The
reforms included the lifting of the death penalty and the introduction
of certain cultural rights, especially for the Kurds. The spring of 2002
was characterized by a very heated, divisive, and contentious debate
on membership in the EU. The standard accusations gained intensity:
that the EU was a Christian club that would never admit Turkey, and
that the reforms being demanded aimed to weaken Turkish national
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The campaign of the Euroskeptics
included hacking the e-mail messages of the European Commission
representative, Karen Fogg. Many public figures supportive of membership who had communicated with her by e-mail were branded as
collaborators and traitors to Turkey and its independence.19 Yet, in
spite of divisions within the coalition, the government received enough
votes to push through a critical reform package in August 2002. It
addressed the above as well as other sensitive issues. Support from
pro-EU civil society groups, ranging from the Turkish Industrialists’
and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) and the Economic Development Foundation (IKV) to ad hoc groups such as Avrupa Hareketi (the
Europe Movement), as well as media campaigns, helped to mobilize
the critical parliamentary margin.20 Powerful pro-EU public opinion
also contributed to this outcome.21 However, relations within the coalition making up the government became strained, and the government
had to hold an early election in November 2002.
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The outcome of the elections in November was no less than a political earthquake. All the government parties as well as those political parties that had served in previous governments lost their seats.22
Instead, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a breakaway party
from an existing Islamist one, won an overwhelming majority of the
seats to comfortably form a government. The social democrat Republican People’s Party (CHP) returned to the parliament as the only opposition party. The AKP had entered elections with a clear pro-EU agenda
and promised to support reforms. The CHP, too, had advocated membership in the EU. Once the government was in place, a campaign was
mounted to convince European governments to offer Turkey a date
for negotiations. However, to the great disappointment of the government, at the Copenhagen summit Turkey was given no more than “a
date for a date.” Accordingly, the European Council promised Turkey that in December 2004 it would consider whether accession negotiations could start “without delay” as long as Turkey completed its
remaining reforms.23 The government had hoped to have negotiations
start before ten new countries formally joined the EU in May 2004. It
was concerned that Turkey could face additional complications if the
decision to start negotiations depended on the support of twenty-five,
rather than fifteen, member countries. The ten new countries included
the Greek side of Cyprus, and the government feared that without a
solution to the Cyprus issue, the Greek Cypriots would likely veto a
date for Turkey.
At the Copenhagen summit, the government also tried very hard
to gain a breakthrough on the deadlocked negotiations over Cyprus
as well as get a negotiation date. The government, freshly in power
and facing considerable opposition from hard-liners and the state
establishment, argued that it would be political suicide to advocate a
compromise on Cyprus and still face the risk of not getting a date for
negotiations. In spite of hectic efforts and growing public opinion in
support of a solution among Turkish Cypriots on the island, the government failed to deliver a breakthrough. Instead, Rauf Denktash, the
president of TRNC and chief negotiator for the Turkish Cypriot side,
walked away from the last round of talks in the Hague in March 2003
without accepting a solution. Subsequently, when the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, prepared his report on Cyprus in April
2003, the Turkish side was labeled the culprit in the failure.24
The government faced these tough political issues during a period
when the actual leader of the AKP, Tayyip Erdogan, could not serve
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as prime minister because of a technicality in Turkish electoral law
that kept him from contesting the November 2002 election. This naturally weakened the political strength of the government. However, in
a by-election held in March to fill an empty seat in parliament, Erdogan was carried into the parliament with a comfortable margin. He
took over the premiership from Abdullah Gül, who continued to serve
in the cabinet as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime
Minister. Subsequently, the government turned its focus on remaining internal reforms to meet the Copenhagen specifications. Two sets
of reforms introduced in June and August critically strengthened the
right to broadcast and educate in minority languages, and curtailed
the institutional channels of influence that the military traditionally
enjoyed over Turkish politics.25 These were highly controversial and
contested reforms that were resisted by supporters of the status quo.
The developments were accompanied by a steady amelioration in the
Turkish economy, which had fallen into a deep recession in February
2001. The conspicuous recovery of the economy became a factor that
steadily strengthened the hand of the government.
The impact of the reforms became increasingly visible during the
second half of 2003. The performance of the Turkish stock exchange,
as well as interest and exchange rates, became visible measures of government performance in respect to the adoption and implementation
of the reforms. The more the “markets” perceived the government’s
performance as positive in respect to a negotiation date, the more the
value of shares at the stock exchange increased and the Turkish currency, traditionally very weak, gained value against the U.S. dollar
as well as the Euro. Furthermore, the public use of Kurdish in the
form of publications, concerts, and conferences (especially in Kurdish populated areas) became much more visible. Maybe most importantly, calls by certain hard-liners went unheeded that emergency rule
should be reintroduced in southeastern provinces because of threats of
instability emanating from neighboring Iraq. Furthermore, the security
forces and the government succeeded in handling the aftermath of the
November 2003 terrorist attacks in Istanbul in a very professional and
effective way. The culprits were identified and prosecuted in an unusually transparent manner, without putting any of the gains from the
reforms into doubt. The government and the prime minister in person
unequivocally expressed empathy and solidarity with the Jewish community in Turkey.
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The progress report and strategy paper on Turkey, prepared by the
European Commission and released in October 2003, acknowledged
the reforms and progress.26 Nevertheless, the Commission did note
that the implementation of the reforms would be closely monitored
and that there remained a number of areas where reforms were still
needed. The Commission also established a link between getting a date
for accession negotiations and the solution of the Cyprus problem. The
linkage provoked reactions in Turkey and arguments that the solution
of the Cyprus problem had not been a part of the Copenhagen political
criteria. The controversy continued until the visit of Romano Prodi in
January 2004, when he affirmed that the solution of the Cyprus problem was not part of the Copenhagen criteria, and that the Commission
would base its final recommendation to the European Council only on
the reforms and their implementation. However, he did note that the
ultimate decision would be a political one and that the absence of a
solution in Cyprus risked affecting the final outcome negatively.
Subsequently, the government did indeed change its policy on
Cyprus, and the Turkish Cypriot community overwhelmingly supported the Annan Plan at a referendum held in April 2004. Although
the rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriots prevented the island
from being united, the Turkish Cypriots were exonerated from the
accusation that they prevented a solution.
In respect to the completion and implementation of the Copenhagen
criteria, a major breakthrough was achieved in June 2004 when Leyla
Zana and her colleagues were released from detention, and broadcasting started in ethnic minority languages, including Kurdish. These
developments were acknowledged by the European Council summit
on 17–18 June 2004. The European Council reiterated its earlier decision to open negotiations “without delay” when and if the European
Commission reports that Turkey “fulfills the Copenhagen criteria.”
III. The Domestic Politics of Getting to Pre-Accession
The Turkish government has had to negotiate the issue of EU membership on the one hand with the EU (in particular the European Commission and the member countries as well as occasionally the European
Parliament) and, on the other hand, with various constituencies within
Turkey itself. The domestic constituencies have included civil society
groups, such as trade unions, business associations, and EU-specific
nongovernmental organizations, as well as political parties and the
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broader public opinion. It has also included the military and various
bureaucracies—in other words, the state establishment. The politics
of negotiating and breaking the resistance to the adoption of reforms
has not been easy. The resistance, especially in the early stages of the
reform process, came from members of the parliament, bureaucracies,
and the military, as well as their allies among the politicians and in
civil society—often academics, journalists, and retired officials, who
could make their views publicly known more easily than currently
serving officials. The government has had to rely on the political support of pro-EU civil society groups and public personalities, ranging
from academics and journalists to pro-EU liberal retired diplomats and
high-ranking retired military officers, to overcome the reluctance to
adopt and support the reforms.
In the first three years of the process that started with the release of
the Accession Partnership (AP) document by the European Commission in November 2000,27 the coalition government was divided within
itself. The right-wing Nationalist Action Party (MHP) was often the first
obstacle in the way of some of the more critical reforms.28 The absence
of coherence and powerful political will to pursue reforms would, in
turn, weaken the government’s ability to mobilize support among crucial bureaucracies, such as the Ministry of Interior and Justice, not to
mention the military. This was most conspicuously manifested during
the preparation of the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis
(NPAA).29 In most other candidate countries, the preparation of such a
document was quite straightforward and completed within a matter of
weeks. Conversely, the Turkish proceedings dragged on until the end
of March. The government had to negotiate endlessly with different
parts of the state apparatus in an effort to find an acceptable formulation for reforms, especially on the more sensitive issues like the lifting
of the death penalty, the expansion of freedom of expression, and the
introduction of cultural rights. There were a number of draft versions
prepared. The final version fell well short of expectations and the AP
itself.
The wording adopted for the critical reforms was vague and ambiguous. Cases in point were the lifting of capital punishment and the
introduction of cultural rights. The AP emphasized the removal of “any
legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother
tongue in TV/radio broadcasting” and the need to ensure the “cultural
diversity and guarantee of cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of
their origin.” It also specified the need to “abolish [the] death penalty,
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[and] sign and ratify Protocol No. 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights” in order to meet the Copenhagen political criteria. In
addition, the AP called for the reduction of the influence of the military
by noting the need to “align the constitutional role of the National
Security Council as an advisory body to the government in accordance with the practice of EU member states.”30 The NPAA was simply silent on the prospects of TV/radio broadcasting in mother-tongue
languages other than Turkish and the reduction of the military’s influence.31 Instead, it noted that the official language of Turkey and that
of education was Turkish. It did, though, stipulate that there could
be no obstacles placed on the free use of other languages and dialects
by people in their day-to-day lives. However, the NPAA did maintain
that this freedom could not be used for the purposes of separatism.
Regarding capital punishment, the NPAA did not go beyond stating
that the parliament would consider lifting it in the medium term, and
remained silent on the adoption of Protocol No. 6.32 Hence, the NPAA
reflected the attempt to strike a balance between the need to meet the
Copenhagen criteria and the unwillingness to implement reforms on
the most sensitive issues.33
It was not surprising that most of these issues were not addressed
until the first half of 2002, with the debate that surrounded them bitterly divisive. Serious tensions occurred within the governing coalition. Ironically, when the reforms were finally adopted in August 2002,
they had gone well beyond what had been envisaged in the NPAA.
However, the critical reforms could only be adopted with the support
of votes from opposition parties. The MHP refused to lend its support. This further strained relations within the governing coalition and
led to a decision to hold early elections. The strong majority that the
new government received in the elections, accompanied by a growing
confidence in the ranks of pro-EU circles, enabled the government to
adopt further reforms during the first half of 2003. The government
improved on earlier reforms of cultural rights, especially by adopting
legislation facilitating their implementation. It also signed Protocol No.
6 as well as Protocol No. 7, which abolished the death penalty in wartime too. The role of the military was indeed curtailed by redefining its
status in the National Security Council. In adopting these reforms, the
government went considerably beyond what was initially stated in the
NPAA. Not surprisingly, the new version of the NPAA, published in
July 2003, is in much greater harmony with the new Accession Partnership document adopted by the EU in March 2003.34
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Nevertheless, the government still faced resistance. This time the
resistance was in respect to implementation. It manifested itself most
openly in the area of cultural rights. There were, for example, reports
of officials refusing to register Kurdish names for newborn babies until
they were instructed to do so by courts ruling in favor of complaints
from the public. Similarly, some local police chiefs attempted to prevent concerts, conferences, or cultural activities held in Kurdish in
southeastern cities or towns. On each occasion, it would be intervention from higher-level local government or courts or the prosecutor’s
office that would resolve the problem. There were also efforts by some
officials to prevent courses in the Kurdish language by raising technical obstacles, claiming that the premises where such courses were
planned did not meet building codes, for example.
However, slowly but surely, implementation appears to be improving, even if the EU and the European Parliament continue to flag implementation problems in respect to cultural rights.35 The government
acknowledges the problems and seems resolute to overcome them.
Implementation problems are routinely addressed at the beginning of
each weekly cabinet meeting to ensure that governmental decisions are
carried out.
The question of Cyprus is one other area where the government
met constant resistance. The previous government had felt compelled to encourage Rauf Denktash to enter negotiations over the plan
announced by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in November 2002.36
This uniquely detailed and comprehensive plan envisaged the establishment of a reunited Cyprus, delicately striking a balance between
the two sides on the island. The negotiations failed to produce a version
of the Plan acceptable to both sides before the Copenhagen European
Council summit in December 2002. An effort to achieve a last minute
compromise by March 2003 failed miserably when the new Turkish
government, overwhelmed with the crisis over Iraq, could not persuade Rauf Denktash and his allies in Turkey to relent. Consequently,
the Greek-Cypriot government would be entering the EU as representing Cyprus. The Helsinki summit had noted: “The European Council
underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of
Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by
the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on
accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this
the Council will take account of all relevant factors.”37 The failure of
the Turkish side to cooperate in finding a solution around the Annan
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Plan, and the declaration by Rauf Denktash that he considered the
Annan Plan “dead,” led the Greek side to clear the final legal hurdle on
the way to membership in May 2004.
The unwillingness to encourage the Turkish-Cypriot side to achieve
a solution via the Annan Plan, in spite of the Turkish government’s
commitment, was a conspicuous example of the difficulties created by
those circles in Turkey committed to preserving the status quo. Preempting a solution to the Cyprus situation had become a convenient
tool in the hands of those who either did not wish to see Turkey progress along the path toward EU membership or who simply resented the
damage the reform process was inflicting upon their interests. Cyprus
was a particularly easy card to play as the plight of Turkish Cypriots
was always considered to be a national cause. Advocates of a solution
in Cyprus risked accusations of wanting to give away Cyprus for the
personal benefits that would accrue from EU membership. Nevertheless, the December 2002 and January 2003 Turkish-Cypriot demonstrations in support of a solution and EU membership, accompanied by an
unprecedented public debate in Turkey about Cyprus, gradually began
to change the climate in favor of the government. The government also
succeeded in consolidating its power and leadership during the course
of the first half of 2003.
The election of Tayyip Erdogan to parliament in a by-election in
March and his popularity as prime minister, in addition to the decisiveness with which his government pushed two sets of critical reforms
through parliament, also strengthened the hand of the government.
The success in getting these reforms adopted brought Turkey very
close to meeting the Copenhagen political criteria. This was acknowledged by the European Commission in its regular progress report for
2003, as well as at the European Council summit in Rome in December.38 However, the encouraging signs from the EU were also accompanied by immense pressure since the absence of a solution over Cyprus
would severely complicate Turkey’s prospects for getting a negotiating
date in December 2004.39
These pressures were exacerbated by the outcome of the December
2003 elections in TRNC. The results indicated a bitterly divided island,
although with a slight edge enjoyed by the ticket that advocated EU
membership and a solution to the problem in Cyprus. This opened
the prospects for the government in Ankara to entertain a last minute
attempt to restart negotiations over the Annan Plan. The government
by now had not only consolidated its power but had also acquired
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experience in mobilizing support for a political initiative. Additionally,
it had the enormous advantage of an economy that was giving robust
signs of recovery. The inflation rate had been falling at a pace well
beyond what had been expected and industrial output was expanding, accompanied by an explosion in exports. The “markets” in Turkey
were optimistic but also very sensitive to any sign of deviation from
policies enhancing the likelihood of Turkey receiving a negotiating
date. A combination of these factors enabled the government to skillfully negotiate, during the course of January 2004, a decision with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the military, and the president’s office—not
to mention Rauf Denktash—to revise Turkey’s decades old policy. The
new policy lent unequivocal support to restarting talks on the basis of
the Annan Plan, with the clear intention of reaching a solution by May
2004, so that the way to the accession of a reunited Cyprus to the EU
would be opened. Tayyip Erdogan argued that Turkey’s new strategy
was “always to be one step ahead of the Greek-Cypriots” in respect to
finding a solution.
Retrospectively, it is highly likely that this revolutionary turnabout
in Turkey’s Cyprus policy will be remembered as the most critical
decision that this government was able to wrench from domestic constituencies resisting the changes. This turnabout may come to be seen
as the moment when the balance between those in Turkey who were in
support of EU membership and those who were against it tipped decisively in favor of the former group.
IV. The Politics of Supporting versus Opposing the EU
At the risk of oversimplification, it is possible to identify two main
groups in respect to the domestic politics of Turkey’s EU membership
aspirations. The first group is composed of Europhiles. They are outright advocates of EU membership for a variety of reasons, ranging
from ideological to political and economic. They argue that efforts to
meet the Copenhagen criteria and pre-accession itself will contribute
to Turkey becoming a more democratic and prosperous country. These
people do not necessarily feel disturbed by the erosion of national
sovereignty, and consider the sharing or transfer of sovereignty with
EU institutions an acceptable cost of membership. In other words, they
are comfortable with the notion of a postmodern state with its pluralist democracy, multicultural identity, and multi-tiered governance.
Among these people there are even those who use a nationalist dis-
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course by arguing that a Turkey that is a member of the EU would also
be a Turkey that is economically, politically, and militarily more powerful and influential in its region.
The other group is composed of Euroskeptics. They resist change
and reform. They consider the reforms a threat to national security and
the independence of the country. Typically, they are extremely wary of
supranationalism. They are suspicious of the EU as well as the international community at large, often arguing that the EU and the West in
general aim to weaken Turkey and cause its territorial disintegration.
Some view the reforms, especially the ones on cultural rights, freedom of expression, and the weakening of the military’s role in Turkish politics, as tools with which the EU aims to implement its grand
policy of weakening Turkey. They consider these reforms dangerous
to Turkey’s ability to survive and meet the security challenges arising
from a particularly problematic neighborhood. In this group, there are
many officials who see their influence and power being eroded by the
reforms. There are also those who are uncomfortable with concepts
like transparent and accountable government. The EU, in their eyes,
is an intruder or a threat to their way of life. There are also those who
oppose the EU on the grounds that membership will erode Turkish
culture and identity.
These two groups, of course, are far from being internally homogenous. Among the advocates of membership in the EU, paradoxically,
there are many who do not actually trust the EU. Public opinion surveys in Turkey regularly record high levels of support for membership
accompanied with low levels of trust in the EU. Many also believe that
the EU would not admit Turkey even if Turkey were to meet all the
Copenhagen criteria.40 On the other hand, among the Euroskeptics
there are also those who argue that they are not against Turkish membership per se. However, they argue that Turkey’s geographical location and the difficult neighborhood that it finds itself in should entitle
Turkey to special treatment. In other words, they advocate the dilution
of some of the reforms, such as the lifting of capital punishment, the
introduction of cultural rights for minority groups, and the reduction
of the influence and role of the military in government decision making.41
Both groups span the political spectrum, Left to Right. Currently,
the AKP, which defines itself as a conservative political party with a
strong Islamist background, is the most vocal advocate of EU membership while the MHP, also a conservative/right-wing nationalist party, is
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conspicuously against membership. Yet public opinion surveys have
also shown that support for membership among MHP voters is surprisingly high. In a survey run in the midst of the divisive debates preceding the August 2002 package, the average of those voting for MHP
and supporting membership was higher (68%) than the average for the
country (64%).42 The social democratic CHP is openly supportive of EU
membership. In the parliament, it has lent support for the reform packages adopted by the government. However, there are many prominent
CHP figures who have on numerous occasions spoken against policies
that would bring Turkey closer to the EU. The Cyprus problem is a
case in point. Both Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP, and some of
his lieutenants have resisted policies seeking a solution to the problem.
Onur Öymen stated that on Cyprus their position was no different
from the nationalist right-wing MHP. Even though there was some
reaction against this statement from within the Party, the leader of
the Party did accuse the government of “selling Cyprus to the Greek
Cypriots.”43
The Motherland Party (ANAP) and the True Path Party (DYP), two
conservative liberal parties that have been voted out of the parliament
in the last elections, have traditionally advocated membership in the
EU. Yet they too have included politicians in their ranks who have not
been very keen to support reforms. One political party that was openly
and unashamedly opposed to the European Union was the Islamist
Welfare Party (Refah), led by Necmettin Erbakan. Refah has since been
replaced by the Saadet Party, which has maintained the same line. In
public opinion polls, it is Saadet voters who have a level of support for
membership in the EU below 50%.44 Lastly, there are left-wing groups
that are as much opposed to the EU as nationalist right-wing groups.
Surprisingly, they often use very similar slogans and discourse as their
nationalist right-wing counterparts. For example, the Socialist Party
and the Turkish Communist Party accuse the EU of imperialism and
wanting to erode Turkey’s national independence and sovereignty.
The state apparatus, with its military, judiciary, police, treasury,
educational establishment, and administration in general, is far from
homogenous. It is possible to find officials that are openly in support
of the EU as well as those who are against it. However, state institutions often avoid making their views known openly. There is a long
established tradition to maintain a uniform facade. The views can often
be deduced, though, from practices or from opinions expressed by
retired personnel. Hence, for example, it is not unusual to find retired
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generals or diplomats who take positions and offer arguments in support of or against EU membership. One institution that is often under
close public scrutiny in respect to EU membership is the military. Both
within Turkey and abroad, the military is often presented as being
against membership. The argument is that the military is uncomfortable with many of the reforms demanded by the Copenhagen political
criteria, especially those that call for the curtailment of their influence.
The military is also often cited as one major, if not the major, opponent
of a solution in Cyprus.
Undoubtedly, the need to accommodate the views of Euroskeptics
within the state bureaucracies and the military played a very important role in why it took the government so long to put together the
first NPAA in 2001, and why this document fell well short of the initial
AP. There were a number of reforms with which the military seemed
uncomfortable, notably reforms centering on freedom of expression
and minority cultural rights. Yet, in the end, the military did not stand
in the way of these reforms. Furthermore, the military did not oppose
the gradual lifting of the emergency rule law in the southeastern provinces of Turkey. (The emergency rule law was introduced in 1987 to
combat the PKK and separatism in southeastern Anatolia.) The law
was considered by many human rights groups as the primary cause of
widespread human rights violations and forced migration.45 In 2002,
when capital punishment was being heatedly debated by the politicians and the public, the military made it very clear that they did not
object to such a reform.46 Most importantly, the military acquiesced to
a reform package in June 2003 that significantly curtailed the powers
of the National Security Council, the body through which the military
traditionally exercised its influence in Turkish politics.47 More surprisingly, in January 2004, the military supported the new governmental
initiative to restart negotiations over Cyprus. When Rauf Denktash
seemed reluctant to lend his support to the initiative of the Turkish
government, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Hilmi
Özkök, cautioned him that the military was behind the initiative.48 Furthermore, in a gesture of confidence, the Commander of the Ground
Forces, General Aytaç Yalman, cancelled a routine visit to inspect Turkish troops on the island.49
Yet there have been a number of occasions when high-ranking officers expressed views that cannot be reconciled with the official position of the military as expressed by the Office of the Chief of Staff. The
Turkish military is known for its discipline and rigid chain of com-
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mand. Hence, the expression of such opinions, openly or covertly, is
considered a sign of discomfort with the official military position and
the government. It is generally known that there is considerable concern in the officer corps about the credentials and credibility of the current government and the AKP in respect to secularism. There are many
in the corps who are suspicious of the government’s commitment to
secularism. The policies as well as statements of government officials
and the AKP are closely scrutinized. Often high-ranking officers do
not shy away from making their opinions heard and even precipitating
a crisis. This mistrust profoundly shapes the attitude of many in the
military toward EU membership and the new reforms.
For the military, the issue of EU membership is very complicated.
Traditionally, the legacy of Ataturk’s modernism has been interpreted
as Turkey joining the West or becoming part of the West. Hence, membership in the EU is sometimes viewed as the acid test of the fulfillment of Ataturk’s legacy and reforms. This point was stressed by
Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff General Büyükanıt at an
international conference in Istanbul in May 2003. He said, “I state once
again the views of the Turkish Armed Forces on this issue with capital
letters; Turkish Armed Forces cannot be against the European Union
because the European Union is the geo-political and geo-strategic ultimate condition for the realization of the target of modernization which
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk chose for the Turkish nation.”50 In spite of
these remarks, many observers think that there has also been considerable apprehension about meeting the Copenhagen political criteria in
the ranks of the military.
Firstly, education and socialization in the military is centered on a
deeply embedded distrust of the West and, by extension, the EU. Generations of officers have been formed with the belief that the West, in
this case the Europeans and the United States, are imperialist and are
driven with the desire to weaken and divide up Turkey. The reforms
that are demanded from Turkey for pre-accession are evaluated from
this perspective. Many in the military genuinely believe that the EU
would never admit Turkey as a member. Hence, they consider at least
some of the reforms as tools to weaken Turkey’s national cohesion and
sovereignty as well as its ability to defend secularism.51
Secondly, the military’s view of international relations is very much
steeped in realpolitik. International politics is viewed as an arena of
power struggle in which the states that are militarily strong and cohesive stand a better chance of surviving. The notion that states can enter
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into win-win cooperative relationships is utterly foreign. They may
recognize that the EU has achieved a Kantian peace zone or a “security
community” among its membership; however, they will simply not
believe that Europeans would be prepared to include Turkey in such
a system.
The frustration associated with the debate over EU membership
and the intentions of the EU in seeking reforms in Turkey leads to
tension that sometimes erupts into the limelight. A case in point is the
virulent and surprising manner in which the Secretary-General of the
National Security Council, General Tuncer Kilinç (at an international
military conference in Istanbul in March 2002), declared that the EU
was a “Christian Club” and that it was a “neo-colonialist force determined to divide Turkey.” He proposed that Turkey abandon its bid for
EU membership and seek closer relations with Russia and Iran. His
remarks precipitated a lively debate in Turkey.52 However, the next day
a former president of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel, delivered a scathing
criticism of the General’s argument verging on mockery. Then-Chief
of the Turkish General Staff General Hüseyin Kivrikoglu, too, felt the
need to reassure the public that General Kilinç had expressed his personal opinion but that for the military, membership in the EU was a
“geostrategic” objective.53
There are an abundance of examples indicative of the unrest in the
higher ranks of the military. A similar situation occurred in January
2004, right at a time when the government was trying to get its new
policy on Cyprus adopted. During the intra-bureaucracy negotiations,
a story was leaked to the Turkish daily Cumhuriyet (known for its support of a hard-line position on Cyprus) that the military had come up
with a plan for Cyprus that conflicted with the one prepared by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.54 The story appeared at a time when there
were critical internal discussions taking place to nudge Turkish policy
toward supporting the Annan Plan—a highly controversial effort particularly among Euroskeptics and advocates of the status quo. The
stories concerning divisions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the military were immediately denied by the Office of the General
Staff. Instead, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff declared that there
were no differences within the state apparatus, and that stories alleging such differences were weakening Turkey’s hand.55 This was also
the case when the media was heavily engaged in a broader debate over
the problem of Cyprus and its link to EU membership. Against this
background, the Commander of the Third Army, General Tolon, made
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a public statement that those who advocated policies amounting to
an abandonment of the TRNC (“ver kurtul” was a slogan used by the
advocates of the status quo in Cyprus and critical of those who supported the Annan Plan) were simply “traitors.”56 His statements provoked a furor in the media as well as a public rebuke from the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül. Once more, the office of the General
Staff had to intervene. The General was summoned to Ankara for consultations and subsequently declared that he had been misunderstood
and that the media had typically twisted his words.
These manifestations of unrest within the military are themselves
signs of a painful transformation that is taking place in the Turkish state
apparatus. However, recent developments suggest that the military, as
well as other state agencies, is beginning to adjust to the new realities
and that the transformation is being consolidated. There is a lot to be
said about the success of the government in changing hearts and minds
within the state apparatus and among Euroskeptics. Undoubtedly, the
support that the government has received from parts of the general
public and pro-EU groups within civil society has also been critical.
Ironically, it is possible to include among the ranks of the Europhiles
the military as well as prominent state officials. In spite of the nature
of education and socialization in the military and the bureaucracy, neither institution is immune to the changes occurring within the country.
Hence, some of the officer corps and bureaucrats are able to distance
themselves from established wisdom and take positions closer to the
ones advocated by Europhiles.
V. The EU and its Impact on Turkish Domestic Politics
One other critical factor in this process of transformation is the interaction between Turkey and the EU. In other words, what the EU does,
how it handles Turkey, and the discourses it uses all have a significant
impact on the debate between Europhiles and Euroskeptics in Turkey. The posture that the EU takes toward Turkey also impacts the
government’s ability to persuade and mobilize various domestic constituencies in support of reforms. It plays a critical role in the balance
between Europhiles and Euroskeptics in the domestic negotiation of
pre-accession.
The more the EU has positively engaged Turkey, the more forthcoming the Turkish side has been in overcoming resistance and obstacles in
the way of better EU-Turkish relations. Positive relations have tended
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to strengthen the hand of Europhiles and the prospects of reform.
Positive moves on the part of Turkey have, in turn, enabled the EU side
to take steps supportive of Turkey’s prospects of pre-accession and
membership. In this case, it is possible to talk about iterations of interactions that resemble a virtuous circle—interactions that bring the two
sides closer to each other while enabling the government and reform
constituencies to tip the balance in their favor against the onslaught
of Euroskeptics. In the course of the last two years it is possible to
speak of such a virtuous circle in EU-Turkish relations. But this was not
always the case.
The 1990s in general were characterized by poor relations and deep
mistrust in EU-Turkish relations. Many EU member governments as
well as the European parliament were critical of Turkey’s human rights
record and its handling of the violence surrounding the Kurdish problem.57 Generally, the EU took the position that Turkey had to get its
own house in order before its membership aspirations could be taken
seriously. The EU’s call for a political solution to the Kurdish problem
and its advocacy of “minority rights” played into the hands of Euroskeptics, who argued that the EU was only interested in weakening
Turkey’s territorial integrity. For example, in 1995, Süleyman Demirel
reacted in an unusually forceful way to remarks made by the French
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppé, that Turkey should find a
political solution to the Kurdish problem. Demirel argued that Juppé’s
statement was unequivocal evidence of Western intentions to create a
Kurdish state in Turkey.58 The decision of the EU at it’s Luxembourg
summit in 1997 to exclude Turkey from the list of candidate countries
for the next round of enlargement aggravated the tension and mistrust
between the EU and Turkey.
The first-ever report on Turkey that was prepared by the EC (in
November 1998) provoked a negative reaction as well. The report
assessed Turkey’s progress toward pre-accession on the basis of the
Copenhagen political criteria. It found Turkey wanting on all these criteria. Regarding the Kurdish problem, the report noted that, “Turkey
will have to find a political and non-military solution to the problem.”59
The references to minority rights and the need for a political solution
provoked criticism and even led to accusations of European aspirations to undermine Turkey’s territorial integrity.60 During an interview,
President Demirel also expressed his discomfort over the need to meet
the Copenhagen criteria on minority rights because of Turkey’s genu-
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ine fear of separatism. He argued that such criteria imposed on Turkey
could complicate its prospects for membership in the EU.61
This negative climate in EU-Turkish relations began to change,
and moves reinforcing cooperation and goodwill started to emerge
in 1999. In February 1999, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan,
was captured in Kenya. He was tried and convicted, receiving a death
sentence in June of that year. The newly elected prime minister of Turkey, Bülent Ecevit, who was known for his lukewarm attitude toward
the EU, became more supportive of EU membership. On the other
hand, the new German social democrat government, led by Gerhard
Schröeder, also began to make statements much more accommodating
of Turkey. Traditionally, the Germans had been the most conspicuous
opponents of giving Turkey EU membership. Ecevit’s commitment to
political reforms in support of greater democracy, and the EU’s positive response, brought the two sides much closer. In December 1999,
Ecevit persuaded his coalition government, including the right-wing
nationalist MHP, to respect a call by the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) for a stay of execution on Öcalan’s death sentence.
Turkey had accepted the right of its citizens to take complaints
against Turkey to the ECHR in 1987, and since then had respected the
Court’s rulings. Öcalan’s lawyers had complained to the ECHR that
the ruling of the Turkish court was unjust. In an effort to review the
complaint, the ECHR issued a stay of execution in November 1999.62
Respecting the ECHR’s call was an extremely difficult and sensitive
issue. Öcalan was seen by a large portion of the public as the culprit
in years of death and destruction. Furthermore, the MHP had made
it into the parliament as well as the coalition government on a ticket
pledging that the death sentence of Öcalan would be carried through.
After a contentious debate, the government decided to acquiesce to the
ECHR call. This was taken by the EU, which required the lifting of the
death penalty as a precondition for pre-accession, as a very positive
and symbolically important gesture. It was a major contributing factor
that opened the way to Turkish candidacy in December 1999.
A positive move from the EU came with the AP, reinforcing those
circles in Turkey that advocated reforms and eventual EU membership.
This document laid down a long list of economic, legal, and political
reforms that Turkey had to introduce in order to meet the Copenhagen
criteria. These included the adoption of cultural rights for minorities.
However, in a marked departure from the progress report of 1998, the
document shied away from using the term minority, a term whose use
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on many occasions had marred EU-Turkish relations.63 Instead, the
framers of the EU document chose to use much more subtle, politically
inoffensive and nuanced language. It called for lifting the restrictions
that denied Turkish citizens the option to broadcast in their mother
tongue. It also called for assisting cultural diversity and securing the
cultural rights (including education in the mother tongue) of all Turkish citizens, irrespective of their origin. The wording clearly manifested
a conscious effort to avoid the term minority and to emphasize cultural
rather than minority rights. Indeed, this helped moderates disarm the
arguments of hard-liners in Turkey. The lack of references to minority
rights and political solutions, especially regarding the Kurds, meant
that hard-liners could not argue their classic case based on the notion
of the Sévres syndrome. Furthermore, it became much more difficult to
accuse moderates of being traitors. Undoubtedly, these developments
were very significant in the adoption of the critical reforms in October
2001 and August 2002 that helped to diffuse the Kurdish problem.
Similar examples can also be offered from foreign policy issues
independent of the Copenhagen political criteria. Since the adoption of
the Treaty on the European Union in 1992, the EU has been striving to
develop a common foreign and security policy. The Helsinki European
Council summit was important not just for the decision on Turkey’s
candidacy but also because it called for the establishment of military
capabilities that would give the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) some teeth. However, ESDP also required the prerogative
of using NATO facilities. Turkey, a longstanding member of NATO,
made it known that it would veto the use of such facilities unless
it was included in the decision-making process.64 The EU countries
keen to have ESDP developed, such as France and Germany, resented
Turkey’s position and considered it an effort to stall European integration. Delicate negotiations pursued between the United States, Britain
informally representing the EU, and Turkey culminated in a preliminary agreement in November 2001 that broke the deadlock over the
use of NATO facilities. It has generally been recognized that Turkey’s
willingness to compromise played an important role in the invitation
for Turkey to participate in the Convention on the Future of Europe,
which would start in 2002 to draft a constitution for Europe.65 Austria
and Germany were known to have objected to Turkey’s participation,
and wanted to limit participation to countries that had already started
pre-accession negotiations. The breakthrough on ESDP is cited as an
important factor that helped tip the balance in favor of Turkey.
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In Turkey, the decision reached at the Laeken summit in December
2001, in turn, helped make up for the deep resentment caused by the
decision of the Nice summit in December 2000.66 At this summit, the
EU adopted the treaty that included institutional adjustments to be
introduced with the next round of enlargement. No allowance was
made for Turkey’s membership. This was interpreted in Turkey, by the
government as well as the public, as a sign that the EU was still not
genuinely concerned about Turkish membership.
The actual breakthrough on ESDP did not arrive until the following year. Once the November compromise had been reached, Britain
took the agreement to the EU. However, this time Greece objected to
certain aspects of the agreement and demanded their modification.
Turkey considered the matter closed and a deadlock developed. It was
tough negotiations between the newly formed Turkish government
and the military, on the one hand, and between Turkey and the EU, on
the other, that eventually led to yet another compromise arrangement,
just days before the December 2002 Copenhagen summit. Without this
breakthrough, it is highly unlikely that Turkey would have received
December 2004 as a clear date when the EU would decide whether or
not to start negotiations for accession. The Copenhagen decision was a
major disillusionment for the new government that had lobbied very
hard for a clear and unequivocal date. Yet, retrospectively, this decision
did provide incentive to the government as well as to the Europhiles to
push for the remaining critical reforms. This was yet another example
of the two sides adopting policies that helped to reinforce confidence
and cooperation with each other.
One last but critical example of the influence of positive interactions between the EU and Turkey comes from January 2004. Romano
Prodi became the first-ever president of the European Commission
to visit Turkey during its more than 40-year-old relationship with the
EU. Mr. Prodi stressed that a solution on Cyprus was not part of the
Copenhagen political criteria that Turkey would be judged upon. The
EU strategy paper adopted for Turkey, together with the 2003 progress
report, had established a direct link between Turkey’s prospects of
obtaining a negotiation date and the solution of the Cyprus problem.
A public furor had exploded in Turkey as a result, and the Turkish
government tried hard to get the reference to Cyprus taken out of the
strategy paper. In Turkey, commentaries argued that the linkage was
yet another example of the EU raising the bar as Turkey got close to
meeting the criteria.
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In his speeches, Prodi made it very clear that the European Commission would base its judgment only on Turkey’s performance in respect
to the Copenhagen political criteria when making its recommendation
to the European Council on whether Turkey should or should not be
given a date.67 He left little doubt that if Turkey continued its current
performance, it would be very likely that the Commission would make
a positive recommendation. He felt that the EU was duty bound to
make such a recommendation if it was itself to live up to the Copenhagen criterion of respecting the “rule of law.” However, he also stressed
that the ultimate decision at the European Council would be political,
and that what happened in respect to the Cyprus problem could influence that decision. His remarks coincided with a period when the government was painstakingly trying to reform Turkey’s Cyprus policy.
At a summit meeting chaired by the president on 8 January, the
decision to support the start of negotiations to find a solution to the
Cyprus problem fell short of validating the Annan Plan. This was considered a sign that the hard-liners still prevailed. However, when the
National Security Council meeting took place on the 23rd of January,
the decision included the Annan Plan as a basis for negotiations. It
was this final breakthrough that allowed the prime minister first to
announce that Turkey was ready to negotiate on the basis of the Annan
Plan at the Davos Economic Forum, and then called on President Bush
to lend support for the negotiations. Prodi’s visit and remarks occurred
on January 15 and 16, right between these two critical summits about
Cyprus. It would not be wrong to suggest that these remarks did make
a positive contribution to the change that occurred between the first
and the second vital meetings on Cyprus in Ankara. Once the results of
the referenda on the Annan Plan emerged, EU governments and officials, such as Gunter Verheugen, praised the Turkish side and committed themselves to advocate and support policies that would improve
the lot of Turkish Cypriots. This helped to legitimize the new Turkish
policy in the eyes of domestic constituencies in Turkey.
The above list is well short of being comprehensive. It is only meant
to illustrate the point that both parties’ positive moves toward each
other have reinforced a virtuous circle that has facilitated the task of
the government in Turkey and the hand of the Europhiles in pushing
reforms through and advocating a solution for Cyprus on the basis of
the Annan Plan. This is not to mean that no negative moves have taken
place. Both sides do make moves that weaken the hands of those who
advocate stronger relations. The point, however, is that compared to

69

Macalester International

Vol. 15

the past, the balance is a positive one and the mistrust has lessened.
The EU is much more willing to make allowances for the occasional
difficulties that the government faces in implementing some of the
reforms. A notable case in point is the retrial of Leyla Zana and her colleagues.
The package of reforms that were adopted in February 2003 opened
the way for the retrial. It is generally accepted that the new trial will
lead to their acquittal, given the changes that were introduced to the
very laws that led to their convictions. The EU has continuously called
for their release from detention during the retrial. However, the court
and the prosecutor’s office have resisted. The government has also
been unable to bring about their release. One of the retrial sessions
took place on the very day that Romano Prodi was visiting Turkey.
The European Commission offered to reconsider the date of his visit
but the Turkish side deemed it unnecessary. In his address to the Turkish parliament on the day the court was due to meet, President Prodi
recalled the importance that the EU attributed to the retrial of Zana
and her colleagues, and to their continued detention. The court once
more failed to ensure their release. Significantly, no crisis erupted in
the relations of both sides. Both sides were much better at appreciating
each other’s difficulties and were willing to focus on the grander longterm objective. It is not surprising that in June 2004 this virtuous circle
of interactions succeeded in bringing about an environment conducive
to the release of Leyla Zana and her colleagues.
VI. Conclusion
Turkey is going through a massive transformation domestically as well
as in terms of its foreign policy. It is generally recognized that at the
pace at which the reforms and their implementation is moving, it is
likely that the regular report of the European Commission will be
positive, and that the Commission will finally recommend that negotiations do start. The remaining challenge for the government is to
ensure that the reforms continue and that those in Turkey who resist
membership do not derail the process. The breakthrough achieved on
Cyprus removed the last possible card that those in the EU who oppose
Turkish membership and their counterpart, the Turkish Euroskeptics,
could use to block Turkey from receiving a starting date for the preaccession process. The process leading to this drastic transformation of
Turkey’s domestic and foreign politics can be attributed, ceteris paribus,
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to the dynamics of the domestic negotiation concerning the adoption
of reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria as well as to the nature of
the interactions between Turkish and EU players.
The decision whether to give a date to Turkey will be a tough one
for the EU. Once a candidate country starts accession negotiations,
membership is considered to be merely a matter of time. There has not
been a single case in which a country that started negotiations has not
been admitted. Yet obviously there could always be a first case. Public
opinion in Europe is wary of this round of enlargement. Support for
enlargement polls below 50%, on average. Support for Turkey has been
even less than that. Furthermore, there are many other factors, ranging from economic ones to the size and culture of Turkey, which work
against the prospect of Turkish membership. Ultimately, though, a
country’s membership has been the prerogative of the leadership in the
candidate countries and in EU member states. In Turkey’s case, leadership will have to play an even greater role. Commentaries appearing
in the European media seem to be increasingly receptive to Turkey’s
membership. Clearly, September 11 and the Iraqi crisis have played
an important role. There is a growing appreciation in Europe of the
importance of allowing Turkey membership in terms of the EU’s ability to continue its mission to export peace and stability to an ever wider
geographical area. Even more importantly, there is a recognition that
a reformed Turkey, with its pluralist democracy and secularism, can
constitute an example for the rest of the Middle East and the Muslim
world, which are themselves on the brink of a major transformation.
For the last couple of years, the challenge of EU membership was
always Turkey’s challenge. Few in Europe believed that Turkey could
meet the challenge. Many hid behind the belief that Turkey would
never be able to meet the Copenhagen political criteria. This time the
challenge is Europe’s challenge. Will Europe be able to admit the centuries old “other” into its ranks? The EU succeeded in reconciling the
rivalry and enmity between France and Germany. Most recently, it succeeded in overcoming the Cold War division in Europe. The outcome
of the challenge will inevitably determine whether both sides succeed
in achieving Turkey’s integration into the EU and anchor Turkey into
the realm of “democratic peace,” as described in John O’Neal and
Bruce Russett’s Triangulating Peace. Or will they fail in that and provoke
a polarization between Turkey and Europe of the kind envisaged in
Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations? Or will events develop in
such a manner that Turkey’s reforms fail to gain root and Turkey drifts
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into a state of “illiberal democracy,” as speculated by Zakaria Fareed in
The Future of Freedom?
Epilogue68
After two days of nerve-wracking negotiations, political brinkmanship, and typical European Union style diplomacy, the European
Council (the highest governing body of the EU, representing 25 member countries) decided to open membership negotiations with Turkey
on 3 October 2005.69 This recent summit had been preceded by a bitter debate in Europe on Turkey’s eligibility for membership and its
“Europeanness.” The resolution of the Cyprus problem also loomed
as an insurmountable obstacle in front of Turkey. Nevertheless, with
an unprecedented will by Turkish standards, the current government
proceeded with the adoption of the remaining critical political reforms.
The Progress Report on Turkey prepared by the European Commission
acknowledged Turkey’s successes and concluded that Turkey had sufficiently met the Copenhagen political criteria. It went on to recommend that negotiations could be opened with Turkey “without delay,”
as soon as some remaining reforms were completed.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, received a hero’s welcome upon their
return from the European Council summit. Most of the media chose
to emphasize the “full” part of the glass and termed the outcome a
“success.” Yet, there are also many in Turkey and Europe who highlight the “empty” part of the glass or at best have received the decision
with mixed feelings. This is a function of the recognition that Turkey’s
road to membership remains paved with a multitude of challenges, if
not obstacles. Some of these challenges actually stem from the “buts”
and qualifications that have been built into the decision to open the
accession talks while another set stems from Europe and Turkey itself.
Yet, these challenges or difficulties cannot hide the fact that the European Council is heralding a new era for both Europe and Turkey, with
potential repercussions for the regions beyond. These give the decision
a historic quality. 
•
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